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A B S T R A C T
Using a stock-ﬂow-fund ecological macroeconomic model, we analyse (i) the eﬀects of climate change on ﬁ-
nancial stability and (ii) the ﬁnancial and global warming implications of a green quantitative easing (QE)
programme. Emphasis is placed on the impact of climate change damages on the price of ﬁnancial assets and the
ﬁnancial position of ﬁrms and banks. The model is estimated and calibrated using global data and simulations
are conducted for the period 2016–2120. Four key results arise. First, by destroying the capital of ﬁrms and
reducing their proﬁtability, climate change is likely to gradually deteriorate the liquidity of ﬁrms, leading to a
higher rate of default that could harm both the ﬁnancial and the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector. Second, climate
change damages can lead to a portfolio reallocation that can cause a gradual decline in the price of corporate
bonds. Third, climate-induced ﬁnancial instability might adversely aﬀect credit expansion, exacerbating the
negative impact of climate change on economic activity. Fourth, the implementation of a green corporate QE
programme can reduce climate-induced ﬁnancial instability and restrict global warming. The eﬀectiveness of
this programme depends positively on the responsiveness of green investment to changes in bond yields.
1. Introduction
Climate change is likely to have severe eﬀects on the stability of the
ﬁnancial system (see, for instance, Aglietta and Espagne, 2016; Batten
et al., 2016; Scott et al., 2017). Two broad climate-related ﬁnancial
risks have been identiﬁed: (a) the transition risks that have to do with
the re-valuation of carbon-intensive assets as a result of shocks related
to the transition to a low-carbon economy; and (b) the physical risks that
are linked to the economic damages of climate-related events. So far,
most studies have concentrated on the implications of transition risks
(see e.g. Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2011; Johnson, 2012; Battiston
et al., 2017; Stolbova et al., 2018; Trinks et al., 2018). Less attention
has been paid to the detailed analysis of physical risks, which have only
partially been explored in macro models by Dietz et al. (2016),
Dafermos et al. (2017) and Bovari et al. (2018). The investigation of the
physical risks is particularly important: it would help us understand
how the ﬁnancial system could be impaired if the transition to a low-
carbon economy is very slow in the next decades and, consequently,
severe global warming is not ultimately avoided. It would also allow us
to understand which policies might be more eﬀective in reducing the
ﬁnancial instability that might stem from climate damages.
In this paper, we develop an ecological macroeconomic model that
sheds light on the physical eﬀects of climate change on ﬁnancial sta-
bility. This is called the DEFINE (Dynamic Ecosystem-FINance-
Economy) model, which builds on the stock-ﬂow-fund model of
Dafermos et al. (2017). The latter relies on a novel synthesis of the
stock-ﬂow consistent (SFC) approach of Godley and Lavoie (2007) with
the ﬂow-fund model of Georgescu-Roegen (1971, ch. 9; 1979, 1984).1
The model is calibrated and estimated using global data and simula-
tions are presented, which illustrate the eﬀects of climate change on the
ﬁnancial system. We pay attention to the following key channels. First,
the increase in temperature and the economic catastrophes caused by
climate change could reduce the proﬁtability of ﬁrms and could dete-
riorate their ﬁnancial position. Accordingly, debt defaults could arise,
which would lead to systemic bank losses. Second, lower ﬁrm proﬁt-
ability combined with global warming-related damages can aﬀect the
conﬁdence of investors, inducing a rise in liquidity preference and a ﬁre
sale of the ﬁnancial instruments issued by the corporate sector.
Dietz et al. (2016) have recently investigated quantitatively the
physical impact of climate change on the ﬁnancial system. They use a
standard integrated assessment model (IAM) and the climate value at
risk (VAR) framework. Assuming that climate change can reduce the
dividend payments of ﬁrms and, hence, the price of ﬁnancial assets,
they provide various estimates about the climate-induced loss in the
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value of ﬁnancial assets. Our study moves beyond their analysis in three
diﬀerent ways. First, by relying on an SFC approach, we portray ex-
plicitly the balance sheets and the ﬁnancial ﬂows in the ﬁnancial sector.
This allows us to model the climate-induced fragility that can be caused
in the ﬁnancial structures of ﬁrms and banks, a feature which is absent
in Dietz et al. (2016). Second, we utilise a multiple ﬁnancial asset
portfolio choice framework, which permits an explicit analysis of the
climate-induced eﬀects on the demand of ﬁnancial assets in a world of
fundamental uncertainty. This allows us to capture the implications of a
ﬁre sale of certain ﬁnancial assets. These implications are not explicitly
considered in the model of Dietz et al. (2016) where climate damages
do not have diversiﬁed eﬀects on diﬀerent ﬁnancial assets. Third, the
ﬁnancial system in our model has a non-neutral impact on economic
activity: credit availability and the price of ﬁnancial assets aﬀect eco-
nomic growth and employment. Accordingly, the interactions between
economic performance and ﬁnancial (in)stability are explicitly taken
into account. This is crucial since the feedback economic eﬀects of bank
losses and asset price deﬂation can exacerbate climate-induced ﬁ-
nancial instability (see Batten et al., 2016). On the contrary, Dietz et al.
(2016) utilise a neoclassical growth framework where long-run growth
is independent of the ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms and banks. This leaves
little room for the analysis of the macroeconomic implications of cli-
mate-induced ﬁnancial problems.
Our methodological approach shares more similarities with Bovari
et al. (2018) who have investigated how climate change can aﬀect the
indebtedness of ﬁrms, using an SFC model. However, their model ab-
stracts from asset prices and assumes a passive banking system in which
there is no explicit credit rationing and no eﬀect of endogenous defaults
on bank capital. This implies that the feedback eﬀects of climate-in-
ducing ﬁnancial instability on the macroeconomy cannot be explicitly
explored, as is the case in the current model.
Our simulation results illustrate that in a business as usual scenario
climate change is likely to have important adverse eﬀects on the default
of ﬁrms, the leverage of banks and the price of ﬁnancial assets. These
eﬀects become more severe after global warming passes the 2.5 °C
threshold. Importantly, climate-induced ﬁnancial instability reinforces
the adverse eﬀects of climate change on economic activity.
An additional contribution of this paper is that it examines how
monetary policy could reduce the risks imposed on the ﬁnancial system
by climate change. Drawing on the recent discussions about the po-
tential use of monetary policy in tackling climate change (see e.g.
Murphy and Hines, 2010; Werner, 2012; Rozenberg et al., 2013;
Anderson, 2015; Barkawi and Monnin, 2015; Campiglio, 2016;
Matikainen et al., 2017; Volz, 2017; Monasterolo and Raberto, 2018),
we examine the extent to which a global green quantitative easing (QE)
programme could ameliorate the ﬁnancial distress caused by climate
change. This programme involves the purchase of green corporate
bonds.
The paper's outline is as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of
the model and the key equations that capture the links between climate
change, ﬁnancial stability and monetary policy. Section 3 describes the
calibration, estimation and validation of the model. Section 4 analyses
our simulations about the eﬀects of climate change on the ﬁnancial
system. Section 5 focuses on the impact of a green QE programme.
Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
The DEFINE model (version 1.0) consists of two big blocks: (i) the
‘ecosystem’ block that encapsulates the carbon cycle, the interaction
between temperature and carbon, the ﬂows/stocks of energy and
matter and the evolution of ecological eﬃciency indicators; (ii) the
‘macroeconomy and ﬁnancial system’ block that includes the ﬁnancial
transactions, the balance sheet structure and the behaviour of house-
holds, ﬁrms, banks, central banks and the government sector. The
technical description of the model and the information about the data
used for its calibration and estimation can be found in Appendix A.
It is assumed that there is one type of material good that can be used
for durable consumption and (conventional and green) investment
purposes. Four matter/energy transformation processes are necessary
for the production of this good and all of them require capital and la-
bour. First, matter (non-metallic minerals and metal ores) has to be
extracted from the ground and has to be transformed into a form that
can be used as an input in the production. Second, useful energy has to
be generated based on non-renewable sources (e.g. oil, gas and coal) or
renewable sources (e.g. sun, wind). Third, recycling has to take place.
Every year a part of the capital stock and the durable consumption
goods that have been accumulated in the socio-economic system are
demolished/discarded; the material content of these accumulated ca-
pital goods and durable consumption goods is called socio-economic
stock.2 A proportion of this demolished/discarded socio-economic stock
is recycled and is used as an inﬂow in the production of the ﬁnal good.
This means that not all of the matter that is necessary for the production
of the good has to be extracted from the ground. Fourth, the ﬁnal good
needs to be produced using material and energy inﬂows from the other
processes.
Crucially, all these four processes, in combination with the func-
tioning of the whole socio-economic system, generate by-products. In
particular, industrial CO2 emissions are produced as a result of the
combustion of fossil fuels. Energy is dissipated in all transformation
processes; this energy cannot be used again. In addition, the demol-
ished/discarded socio-economic stock that is not recycled becomes
waste. Part of this waste is hazardous and can have adverse eﬀects on
the health of the population.
Since the model focuses on the aggregate eﬀects of production, all
the above-mentioned processes have been consolidated and are pre-
sented as part of the total production process. An unconsolidated for-
mulation of the production process would make the model and its ca-
libration much more complicated without changing the substance of the
analysis that we pursue here. However, such an unconsolidated version
would be useful for the analysis of intra-ﬁrm dynamics and could be the
subject of future extensions of the model.
Although capital, labour, energy and matter are all necessary in the
transformation processes, these resources do not directly determine the
level of production as long as they are not scarce: in the absence of
scarcity, the level of production is demand-determined, in line with the
post-Keynesian tradition. However, if any of these resources is not
suﬃcient to satisfy the demand, production is directly aﬀected by re-
source scarcity. In particular, we assume that, under supply-side con-
straints, consumption and investment demand might decline.
Moreover, although all these resources are necessary for the production
of goods based on our Leontief-type production function (i.e. there is
imperfect substitutability), their relative use changes because of tech-
nological progress.
The way that carbon emissions aﬀect climate change follows closely
Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013). In particular, CO2 emissions lead to an
increase in atmospheric CO2 concentration. The evolution of CO2 con-
centration is aﬀected by the carbon cycle that captures the exchange of
carbon between the atmosphere and the upper ocean/biosphere and
between the upper ocean/biosphere and the lower ocean. The accu-
mulation of atmospheric CO2 and other greenhouse gases increases
radiative forcing. This increase places upward pressures on atmospheric
temperature.
A crucial distinction is made between green capital and conven-
tional capital. Compared to conventional capital, green capital is
characterised by lower energy intensity, lower material intensity and
2 This is a term used in material ﬂow analysis (see e.g. Krausmann et al., 2015). In
general, socio-economic stock also includes animal livestock and humans. However, these
stocks (whose mass remains relatively stable over time) are not included in our analysis.
As will be explained below, socio-economic stock is measured in Gigatonnes.
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higher recycling rate. Moreover, green capital produces energy using
renewable sources, while conventional capital produces energy using
the non-renewable sources. Hence, the use of green capital is conducive
to a low-carbon economy.3 As the proportion of green capital to con-
ventional capital increases, the goods consumed by households are
produced in a more environmentally friendly way. However, we do not
make a distinction between conventional and green consumption
goods. This means that households' environmental preferences do not
have a direct impact on the decisions of ﬁrms about green and con-
ventional investment.
Firms invest in conventional and green capital by using retained
proﬁts, loans and bonds. Commercial banks accumulate capital and
distribute part of their proﬁts to households. They impose credit ra-
tioning on ﬁrm loans. This means that they play an active role in the
determination of output and the accumulation of green capital.
Households receive labour income, buy durable consumption goods and
accumulate wealth in the form of deposits, corporate bonds and gov-
ernment securities (there are no household loans). Corporate bonds can
be either green or conventional. When the demand for green bonds
increases, the price of these bonds tends to go up, leading to a lower
cost of borrowing for green projects.
Therefore, we overall have that a higher willingness of banks to
provide credit for green projects and a higher demand for green bonds
by households boosts innovative green investment. At the same time,
higher green investment can reduce the physical risks for the ﬁnancial
system, as will be explained in detail below. This implies that our model
allows us to investigate the ﬁnance-green innovation nexus. However,
there are various aspects of the ﬁnance-green innovation nexus that are
not analysed in this paper. In particular, the ﬁnancing of green in-
vestment can lead to fundamental changes in the way that the pro-
duction system uses energy and matter, causing a shift to a new techno-
economic paradigm. As has been emphasised in the neo-
Schumpeterian/evolutionary literature (see e.g. Perez, 2009, 2010), a
shift to a new techno-economic paradigm might entail transition risks,
can cause ﬁnancial booms and busts and can lead to fundamental socio-
economic changes. The detailed investigation of these aspects of the
transition to a more ecologically eﬃcient economy can be the subject of
future applications and extensions of the model.4
Central banks play a key role in our model. They determine the base
interest rate, provide liquidity to the commercial banks and purchase
government securities and corporate bonds. When they buy green
corporate bonds as part of a green QE programme, they place down-
ward pressures on the green bond yields, and this has positive eﬀects on
the cost of borrowing for green projects. Governments collect taxes,
decide about the level of government expenditures and can implement
bailout programmes if there are ﬁnancial problems in the banking
sector.
Inﬂation has been assumed away and, for simplicity, the price of
goods is equal to unity. We use US dollar ($) as a reference currency.
The model has an annual time step.
The skeleton of the model is captured by four matrices. The ﬁrst
matrix is the physical ﬂow matrix (Table 1), which portrays the inﬂows
and the outﬂows of matter and energy that take place as a result of the
production process. The First Law of Thermodynamics implies that
energy and matter cannot be created or destroyed. This is reﬂected in
the material and energy balance. The second matrix is the physical
stock-ﬂow matrix (Table 2), which presents the dynamic change in
material and non-renewable energy reserves, the atmospheric CO2
concentration, the socio-economic stock and the stock of hazardous
waste. The ﬁrst row of the matrix shows the stocks of the previous year.
The last row presents the stocks at the end of the current year. Additions
to stocks are denoted by a plus sign. Reductions of stocks are denoted
by a minus sign. The third matrix is the transactions ﬂow matrix
(Table 3), which shows the transactions that take place between the
various sectors of the economy. Inﬂows are denoted by a plus sign and
outﬂows are denoted by a minus sign. The last matrix is the balance
sheet matrix (Table 4) which includes the assets and the liabilities of the
sectors. We use a plus sign for assets and a minus sign for liabilities.
The model extends the model developed by Dafermos et al. (2017)
by including a bond market, central banking, the government sector,
household portfolio choice and an endogenous rate of default for ﬁrms.
In what follows we present the equations of the model that are more
relevant for the interactions between climate change, ﬁnancial stability
and monetary policy. A detailed description of the equations of the
model can be found in Appendix A.
2.1. Green Capital, Energy Intensity and Renewable Energy
Green capital allows ﬁrms to produce the same output with less
energy. This is captured by the following logistic function:
= − −
+ − − −
ε ε ε ε
π e1 π K K
max
max min
5
( / )G C6 1 1 (1)
where ε is energy intensity, π5 and π6 are positive parameters and εmax
and εmin are, respectively, the maximum and the minimum potential
values of energy intensity. As the ratio of green capital (KG) to con-
ventional capital (KC) increases, energy intensity goes down. The use of
the logistic function implies that the installation of green capital (re-
lative to conventional capital) initially generates a slow improvement in
energy intensity. However, as installation expands further, the im-
provement reaches a take-oﬀ point after which energy intensity im-
proves much more rapidly, due to the learning obtained from installa-
tion experience and the overall expansion of green capital
infrastructure that has positive network eﬀects. Finally, as energy in-
tensity approaches its potential minimum, improvement starts to slow.
A similar logistic function is used for the eﬀects of green capital
accumulation on the share of renewable energy in total energy pro-
duced (θ):
=
+ − − −
θ
π e
1
1 π K K7 ( / )G C8 1 1 (2)
where π7 and π8 are positive parameters. By deﬁnition, the maximum
Table 1
Physical ﬂow matrix.
Material balance Energy balance
Inputs
Extracted matter +M
Renewable energy +ER
Non-renewable energy +CEN +EN
Oxygen used for fossil fuel combustion +O2
Outputs
Industrial CO2 emissions −EMISIN
Waste −W
Dissipated energy −ED
Change in socio-economic stock −ΔSES
Total 0 0
The table refers to annual global ﬂows. Matter is measured in Gt and energy is
measured in EJ. A detailed description of the symbols can be found in Appendix
A.
3 A more realistic formulation would be to assume diﬀerent ‘shades of green’ depending
on the number of ‘green’ properties that each capital has. In that case, the ‘greenest’
capital would be that capital that can generate renewable energy and is endowed by
lower energy intensity, lower material intensity and higher recycling rate compared to
conventional capital. On the other hand, the least ‘green’ capital would be the capital that
has only one of these properties. However, such a formulation would complicate the
model signiﬁcantly since it would require the distinction between many types of green
investment and would make the calibration of the model a much more challenging ex-
ercise.
4 For an SFC model that has analysed the interlinkages between technological change,
ﬁnance and the real economy, drawing on the literature on techno-economic paradigms,
see Caiani et al. (2014).
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potential value of θ is 1. Note that in Dafermos et al. (2017) the for-
mulation of the links between green capital and ecological eﬃciency
indicators is quite diﬀerent since it does not rely on logistic functions.
The use of logistic functions in the present model allows for a more
realistic representation that takes into account the processes of
learning-by-doing and learning-by-installing, which play a key role in
the diﬀusion of new technologies.5 It also allows us to derive patterns
about the future trajectories of energy intensity and renewable energy
that are similar with those of other related studies (see, for instance,
Jones and Warner, 2016; Peters et al., 2017).
2.2. Output Determination and Damages
Eq. (3) shows our Leontief-type production function:
=∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗Y Y Y Y Ymin( , , , )M E K N (3)
where Y∗ is the potential output. The potential output is the
minimum of (i) the matter-determined potential output (YM∗) which
depends on material reserves, (ii) the energy-determined potential
Table 2
Physical stock-ﬂow matrix.
Material reserves Non-renewable energy
reserves
Atmospheric CO2 concentration Socio-economic stock Hazardous waste
Opening stock REVM-1 REVE-1 CO2AT-1 SES−1 HWS−1
Additions to stock
Resources converted into reserves +CONM +CONE
CO2 emissions +EMIS
Production of material goods +MY
Non-recycled hazardous waste +hazW
Reductions of stock
Extraction/use of matter or energy −M −EN
Net transfer of CO2 to oceans/biosphere +(φ11− 1)CO2AT−1+φ21CO2UP−1
Demolished/disposed socio-economic
stock
−DEM
Closing stock REVM REVE CO2AT SES HWS
The table refers to annual global stocks and ﬂows. Matter is measured in Gt and energy is measured in EJ. A detailed description of the symbols can be found in
Appendix A.
Table 3
Transactions ﬂow matrix.
Households Firms Commercial banks Government
sector
Central banks Total
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital
Consumption −C +C 0
Government expenditures +G −G 0
Conventional investment +IC −IC 0
Green investment +IG −IG 0
Household disposable income net
of depreciation
−YHD +YHD 0
Wages +wN −wN 0
Taxes −TH −TF +T 0
Firms' proﬁts +DP −TP +RP 0
Commercial banks' proﬁts +BPD −BP +BPU 0
Interest on deposits +intDD-1 −intDD-1 0
Depreciation of green capital −δKG-1 +δKG-1 0
Depreciation of conventional
capital
−δKC-1 +δKC-1 0
Interest on conventional loans −intCLC-1 +intCLC-1 0
Interest on green loans −intGLG-1 +intGLG-1 0
Interest on conventional bonds +couponCbCH-1 −couponCbC-1 +couponCbCCB-1 0
Interest on green bonds +couponGbGH-1 −couponGbG-1 +couponGbGCB-1 0
Interest on government securities +intSSECH-1 +intSSECB-1 −intSSEC−1 +intSSECCB-1 0
Interest on advances −intAA−1 +intAA-1 0
Depreciation of durable
consumption goods
−ξDC−1 +ξDC-1 0
Central bank's proﬁts +CBP −CBP 0
Bailout of banks +BAILOUT −BAILOUT 0
Δdeposits −ΔD +ΔD 0
Δconventional loans +ΔLC −ΔLC 0
Δgreen loans +ΔLG −ΔLG 0
Δconventional bonds −p̅CΔbCH +p̅CΔbC −p̅CΔbCCB 0
Δgreen bonds −p̅GΔbGH +p̅GΔbG −p̅GΔbGCB 0
Δgovernment securities −ΔSECH −ΔSECB +ΔSEC −ΔSECCB 0
Δadvances +ΔA −ΔA 0
Δhigh-powered money −ΔHPM +ΔHPM 0
Defaulted loans +DL −DL 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The table refers to annual global ﬂows in trillion US$. A detailed description of the symbols can be found in Appendix A.
5 For the importance of these processes in energy systems and renewable energy
technologies, see e.g. Kahouli-Brahmi (2009) and Tang and Popp (2016).
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output (YE∗) which is a function of non-renewable energy reserves, (iii)
the capital-determined potential output (YK∗) that relies on capital
stock and capital productivity, and (iv) the labour-determined potential
output (YN∗) which depends on labour force and labour productivity.
The actual output (Y) is demand-determined. Aggregate demand is
equal to consumption expenditures (C) plus investment expenditures (I)
plus government expenditures (G):
= + +Y C I G (4)
However, demand is not independent of supply. When Y approaches
Y∗, demand tends to decline due to supply-side constraints (this is
achieved via our investment and consumption functions described
below).
Output determination is aﬀected by climate change as follows:
global warming causes damages to capital stock and capital pro-
ductivity, decreasing YK∗; it also causes damages to labour force and
labour productivity, reducing YN∗.6 These damages aﬀect output in two
ways. First, by experiencing or observing these damages, households
and ﬁrms become more pessimistic about their future economic posi-
tion. In particular, climate damages might increase the fears of en-
trepreneurs that their capital will be destroyed and that their proﬁt-
ability will be reduced. Moreover, natural disasters and health problems
might induce households to save more for precautionary reasons.7
Therefore, consumption and investment demand are lower compared to
what would be the case without damages. As a result, aggregate de-
mand goes down when damages increase.8 Second, the climate-induced
reduction in YK∗ and YN∗ leads to a lower Y∗. If aggregate demand is far
below Y∗, this second channel does not have a direct impact on output
produced. However, when Y becomes suﬃciently close to Y∗, invest-
ment and consumption decrease even more due to the climate damages,
so as to be in line with the supply constraints.
Eq. (5) is the damage function, which shows how atmospheric
temperature (TAT) and damages are linked:
= −
+ + +
D
η T η T η T
1 1
1T AT AT AT1 2 2 3 6.754 (5)
DT is the proportional damage which lies between 0 (no damage)
and 1 (complete catastrophe). Eq. (5) has been proposed by Weitzman
(2012); η1, η2, η3≥ 0.9 The variable DT enters into the equations that
determine capital stock, labour force, capital productivity and labour
productivity, aﬀecting thereby potential output. It also enters into the
consumption and investment demand functions. Drawing on de Bruin
et al. (2009), a distinction is made between gross damages and net
damages. Gross damages are the initial climate changes without
adaptation measures, while net damages are the damages after the
implementation of adaptation measures.10 We assume that capital, la-
bour and their productivities are aﬀected by net damages. However,
households and ﬁrms form expectations based on gross damages. We
interpret Eq. (5) as a gross damage function.
2.3. The Financing of Investment
Firms' investment is formalised as a two-stage process. At a ﬁrst
stage, ﬁrms decide their overall desired investment in both green and
conventional capital (ID). At a second stage, they allocate their desired
investment between the two types of capital. Eq. (6) captures the ﬁrst
stage:
= + + −−
+
−
+
−
−
−
−
−
−
− − − −I α u r ur ue um K ε K δK D( ( , , , , ) )(1 )D I T1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (6)
where K is the capital stock and δ is the depreciation rate. Net invest-
ment is aﬀected by a number of factors. First, following the Kaleckian
approach (see e.g. Blecker, 2002), it depends positively on the rate of
(retained) proﬁts (r) and the rate of capacity utilisation (u). The impact
of these factors is assumed to be non-linear in general line with the
tradition that draws on Kaldor (1940). This means that when the proﬁt
rate and capacity utilisation are very low or very high, their eﬀects on
investment become rather small.
Second, following Skott and Zipperer (2012), we assume a non-
linear impact of the unemployment rate (ur) on investment: when un-
employment approaches zero, there is a scarcity of labour that dis-
courages entrepreneurs to invest. This employment eﬀect captures
Marx's and Kalecki's insights, according to which high employment
strengthens the power of workers, having an adverse impact on the
business climate. Theoretically, this negative eﬀect of employment
could be put into question in the presence of immigration and labour-
augmenting investment. In the presence of immigration, entrepreneurs
can expect that the ﬂow of immigrants will relax the labour shortage
constraint. Thus, investment might not decline when employment ap-
proaches the full employment level. However, this does not apply in our
model, since we analyse the global economy and, thus, there is no
immigration eﬀect. Regarding labour-augmenting investment, it could
be argued that when entrepreneurs observe an unemployment rate
close to zero, they could relax the labour shortage constraint by in-
creasing investment that enhances labour productivity. However, the
adverse impact of climate change on labour productivity, that takes
place in our model, makes it more diﬃcult for the entrepreneurs to
Table 4
Balance sheet matrix.
Households Firms Commercial banks Government sector Central banks Total
Conventional capital +KC +KC
Green capital +KG +KG
Durable consumption goods +DC +DC
Deposits +D −D 0
Conventional loans −LC +LC 0
Green loans −LG +LG 0
Conventional bonds +pCbCH −pCbC +pCbCCB 0
Green bonds +pGbGH −pGbG +pGbGCB 0
Government securities +SECH +SECB −SEC +SECCB 0
High-powered money +HPM −HPM 0
Advances −A +A 0
Total (net worth) +VH +VF +KB −SEC +VCB +KC+KG+DC
The table refers to annual global stocks in trillion US$. A detailed description of the symbols can be found in Appendix A.
6 For a discussion of these damages, see Appendix A and the references therein.
7 For some empirical evidence about the impact of natural disasters on the saving
behaviour of households, see Skidmore (2001).
8 We assume that the expectations of households and ﬁrms about climate change da-
mages are adaptive. Hence, their consumption and investment decisions are determined
based on the damages of the previous year.
9 Our damage function captures the aggregate eﬀects of climate change. For a damage
function that considers explicitly the heterogeneity of climate shocks across agents, see
Lamperti et al. (2018). 10 In our deﬁnition net damages do not include the ﬁnancial cost of adaptation.
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expect that more investment in labour-augmenting technologies would
relax the labour shortage constraint. Therefore, in the presence of cli-
mate change, it is less likely that ﬁrms will try to invest more in order to
increase productivity and reduce the employment rate.11
Third, the scarcity of energy and material resources can dampen
investment, for example because of a rise in resource prices; ue and um
capture the utilisation of energy and material resources respectively.
This impact, however, is highly non-linear: energy and material scarcity
aﬀects investment only once the depletion of the resources has become
very severe.
Forth, in order to capture exogenous random factors that might
aﬀect desired investment, we have assumed that ID also depends on a
random component, εI, that follows a stochastic AR(1) process. Overall,
our investment function implies that demand declines (or stops in-
creasing) when it approaches potential output. This allows us to take
explicit into account the environmental supply-side eﬀects on aggregate
demand mentioned above.
Eqs. (7) and (8) refer to the second stage of ﬁrms' investment pro-
cess:
=I βIGD D (7)
= −I I ICD D GD (8)
where β is the share of green investment (IGD) in overall desired in-
vestment (Eq. (7)). Desired conventional investment (ICD) is determined
as a residual (Eq. (8)).
The share of green investment is determined as follows:
= + − − + − −− − − −β β β β sh int int sh yield yield[ ( ) (1 )( )]L G C L G C0 1 2 1 1 1 1
(9)
where intC is the interest rate on conventional loans, intG is the interest
rate on green loans, yieldC is the yield on conventional bonds, yieldG is
the yield on green bonds and shL is the share of loans in the total li-
abilities of ﬁrms (loans plus bonds).
Eq. (9) suggests that the share of green investment is aﬀected by two
factors. The ﬁrst factor, captured by the term β0+ β1, reﬂects exo-
genous developments, such as the cost of installing and using green
capital relative to conventional capital or institutional/policy changes
that promote green investment (such as carbon pricing).12 The second
factor, captured by the term β2[shL−1(intG− intC)+ (1− shL−1)
(yieldG−1− yieldC−1)], reﬂects the borrowing cost of investing in green
capital relative to conventional capital. As the cost of borrowing of
green capital (via bank lending or bonds) declines compared to con-
ventional capital, ﬁrms tend to increase green investment.
As mentioned above, retained proﬁts are not in general suﬃcient to
cover the desired investment expenditures. This means that ﬁrms need
external ﬁnance, which is obtained via bonds and bank loans. It is as-
sumed that ﬁrms ﬁrst issue bonds and then demand new loans from
banks in order to cover the rest amount of their desired expenditures.
Only a proportion of the demanded new loans is provided. In other
words, the model assumes that there is a quantity rationing of credit.
This is in line with recent empirical evidence that shows that the
quantity rationing of credit is a more important driver of macro-
economic activity than the price rationing of credit (see Jakab and
Kumhof, 2015).
For simplicity, the bonds issued by ﬁrms are assumed to be one-year
coupon bonds.13 Once they have been issued at their par value, their
market price and yield are determined according to their demand.
Firms set the coupon rate of bonds based on their yield in the previous
year. This means that an increase in the market price of bonds com-
pared to their par value causes a decline in their yield, allowing ﬁrms to
issue new bonds with a lower coupon rate.
The proportion of ﬁrms' desired investment, which is funded via
bonds, is given by:
= +−b b
x I
pC C
C
D
C
1
1
(10)
= +−b b
x I
pG G
G
D
G
1
2
(11)
where bC is the number of conventional bonds, bG is the number of
green bonds, x1 is the proportion of ﬁrms' conventional desired in-
vestment ﬁnanced via bonds, x2 is the proportion of ﬁrms' green desired
investment funded via bonds, pC is the par value of conventional bonds
and pG is the par value of green bonds.
The proportion of desired investment covered by green or conven-
tional bonds is a negative function of the bond yield. Formally:
= − −x x x yieldC1 10 11 1 (12)
= − −x x x yieldG2 20 21 1 (13)
where x10, x11, x20, x21 > 0.
We postulate a price-clearing mechanism in the bond market:
=p B
bC
C
C (14)
=p B
bG
G
G (15)
where BC and BG denote the value of conventional and green bonds held
by households and central banks and pC and pG is the market price of
conventional and green bonds, respectively. Prices tend to increase
whenever households and central banks hold a higher amount of cor-
porate bonds in their portfolio. A rise in the price of bonds produces a
decline in the bond yield, which has two eﬀects on ﬁrms' investment.
First, since ﬁrms pay a lower coupon rate on bonds, their proﬁtability
improves increasing their desired investment. Second, a lower bond
yield (which can result from a rise in bond prices) induces ﬁrms to
increase the proportion of desired investment covered via bonds. This is
crucial because ﬁrms need to rely less on bank lending in order to ﬁ-
nance their investment. The disadvantage of bank lending is that, due to
credit rationing, banks provide only a proportion of the loans de-
manded by ﬁrms. Accordingly, the less ﬁrms rely on bank loans in order
to ﬁnance their desired investment the higher their ability to undertake
their desired investment.
Based on ﬁrms' budget constraint, the new loans demanded by ﬁrms
are determined as follows:
= − + − −− −NL I βRP repL δK p bΔGD GD G G G G1 1 (16)
= − − + − −− −NL I β RP repL δK p b(1 ) ΔCD CD C C C C1 1 (17)
where NLGD denotes the desired new green loans, NLCD denotes the
desired new conventional loans, LG is the outstanding amount of green
loans, LC is the outstanding amount of conventional loans, RP denotes
the retained proﬁts of ﬁrms and rep is the loan repayment ratio.
Firms might default on their loans. When this happens, a part of
their accumulated loans is not repaid, deteriorating the ﬁnancial posi-
tion of banks. The amount of defaulted loans (DL) is equal to:
= −DL defL 1 (18)
where L denotes the total loans of ﬁrms.
The rate of default (def) is assumed to increase when ﬁrms become
less liquid. The illiquidity of ﬁrms is captured by an illiquidity ratio,
illiq, which expresses the cash outﬂows of ﬁrms relative to their cash
11 Note, though, that our model takes into account the general role of labour-aug-
menting technologies by using the Kaldor-Verdoorn law in the determination of labour
productivity.
12 Future extensions of the model could include an explicit eﬀect of carbon pricing on
the share of green investment. The model can also incorporate the direct eﬀect of carbon
taxes on the proﬁts of ﬁrms and the taxes collected by the government.
13 This assumption, which does not change the essence of the analysis, allows us to
abstract from complications that would arise from having ﬁrms that accumulate bonds
with diﬀerent maturities.
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inﬂows. Cash outﬂows include wages, interest, taxes, loan repayments
and maintenance capital expenditures (which are equal to deprecia-
tion). Cash inﬂows comprise the revenues from sales and the funds
obtained from bank loans and the issuance of bonds. The default rate is
a non-linear positive function of illiq:
= −
+
def f illiq( )1 (19)
Eq. (19) suggests that, as cash outﬂows increase compared to cash
inﬂows, the ability of ﬁrms to repay their debt declines.
2.4. The Portfolio Choice and Consumption of Households
Households invest their lagged ﬁnancial wealth (VHF−1), which is a
proxy for their expected one, in four diﬀerent assets: government se-
curities (SECH), conventional corporate bonds (BCH), green corporate
bonds (BGH) and deposits (D); intS is the interest rate on government
securities and intD is the interest rate on deposits. In the portfolio
choice, captured by Eqs. (20)–(23n), Godley's (1999) imperfect asset
substitutability framework is adopted.14
= + ′ + + +
+ +
−
− − −
−
−
SEC
V
λ λ D λ int λ yield λ yield
λ int λ Y
V
H
HF
T S C G
D
H
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1
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= + ′ + + +
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= + ′ + + +
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= + − − − −−D D Y C SEC p b p bΔ Δ ΔH H C CH G GH1 (23)
Households' asset allocation is driven by three factors. The ﬁrst
factor is the global warming damages. We posit that damages aﬀect
households' conﬁdence and increase the precautionary demand for
more liquid and less risky assets (see also Batten et al., 2016). Since
damages destroy capital and the proﬁtability opportunities of ﬁrms, we
assume that as DT increases, households reduce their holding of cor-
porate conventional bonds and increase the proportion of their wealth
held in deposits and government securities, which are considered
safer.15 Second, asset allocation responds to alterations in the relative
rates on return. The holding of each asset relies positively on its own
rate of return and negatively on the other assets' rate of return. Third, a
rise in the transactions demand for money, as a result of higher ex-
pected income (YH−1), induces households to substitute deposits for
other assets.16
Households' consumption (CN), adjusted for global warming da-
mages, depends on lagged income (which is a proxy for the expected
one) and lagged ﬁnancial wealth (Eq. (24)). However, Eq. (24) holds
only when there are no supply-side constraints; in that case, C= CN. If
the overall demand in the economy is higher than the supply-de-
termined output, Y∗, consumption adjusts such that the overall demand
in the economy is below Y∗; note that pr is slightly lower than 1. This is
shown in Eq. (25).
= + −− − −C c Y c V D( )(1 )N H HF T1 1 2 1 1 (24)
= + + < = − −∗ ∗C C C I G Y C pr Y Gif ; otherwise ( 1)N N (25)
2.5. Credit Rationing and Bank Leverage
As mentioned above, banks impose credit rationing on the loans
demanded by ﬁrms: they supply only a proportion of demanded loans.
Following the empirical evidence presented in Lown and Morgan
(2006), the degree of credit rationing both on conventional loans (CRC)
and green loans (CRG) relies on the ﬁnancial health of both ﬁrms and
banks. In particular, credit rationing increases as the debt service ratio
of ﬁrms (dsr) increases,17 as the bank leverage (levB) increases relative
to its maximum acceptable value (levBmax) and as the capital adequacy
ratio (CAR) decreases compared to its minimum acceptable value
(CARmin)18:
⎜ ⎟= ⎛
⎝
− − ⎞
⎠
+−
+
−
+
−
−
CR r dsr lev lev CAR CAR ε, ( ) , ( )C B B CR1 1 max 1 min (26)
⎜ ⎟= ⎛
⎝
− − ⎞
⎠
+−
+
−
+
−
−
CR l dsr lev lev CAR CAR ε, ( ) , ( )G B B CR1 1 max 1 min (27)
As in the case of investment, we assume that credit rationing is also
dependent on a random component, εCR, that follows a stochastic AR(1)
process.
The bank leverage ratio is deﬁned as:
= + + +lev L L SEC HPM K( )/B C G B B (28)
where SECB is the government securities that banks hold, HPM is high-
powered money and KB is the capital of banks.
The capital adequacy ratio of banks is equal to:
= + +CAR K w L L w SEC/[ ( ) ]B L C G S B (29)
where wL and wS are the risk weights on loans and securities respec-
tively.
We assume that when the bank leverage ratio becomes higher than
its maximum value and/or the capital adequacy ratio falls below its
minimum value, the government steps in and bailouts the banking
sector in order to avoid a ﬁnancial collapse. The bailout takes the form
of a capital transfer. This means that it has a negative impact on the
ﬁscal balance and the government acquires no ﬁnancial assets as a re-
sult of its intervention (see Popoyan et al., 2017 for a similar assump-
tion). The bailout funds are equal to the amount that is necessary for the
banking sector to restore the capital needed in order to comply with the
regulatory requirements.
2.6. Central Banks and Green QE
Central banks determine the base interest rate, provide liquidity to
commercial banks (via advances) and buy government securities
14 The parameters in the portfolio choice equations satisfy the horizontal, vertical and
symmetry constraints.
15 It could be argued that the demand for green corporate bonds is also aﬀected ne-
gatively by the climate change damages that harm ﬁrms' ﬁnancial position. However,
climate change damages might at the same time induce households to hold more green
bonds in order to contribute to the restriction of global warming. Hence, the overall
impact of damages on the demand of green bonds is ambiguous. For this reason, we
assume that λ′30= 0 in our simulations. Generally, it should be noted that the modelling
of the eﬀects of climate change on portfolio decisions is a very challenging task given the
lack of suitable data. Our formulation should therefore be viewed only as a ﬁrst attempt
to model these damages. Further research on this topic is essential.
16 Note that balance sheet restrictions require that Eq. (23n) must be replaced by Eq.
(footnote continued)
(23) in the computer simulations.
17 The debt service ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of debt payment commitments (interest
plus principal repayments) to proﬁts before interest. Its key diﬀerence with the illiquidity
ratio is that the latter takes into account the new ﬂow of credit.
18 In our simulations, the maximum bank leverage and the minimum capital adequacy
ratio are determined based on the Basel III regulatory framework.
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(acting as residual purchasers). Moreover, in the context of QE pro-
grammes, they buy bonds issued by the ﬁrm sector. Currently, central
banks do not explicitly distinguish between the holdings of conven-
tional and green bonds. However, in order to analyse the implications
of a green QE programme, we assume that central banks announce
separately the amount of conventional bond and green bond purchases.
The value of conventional corporate bonds held be central banks (BCCB)
is:
= −B s BCCB C C 1 (30)
where sC is the share of total outstanding conventional bonds that
central banks desire to keep on their balance sheet. Currently, this share
is very low since the corporate bond purchases of central banks re-
present a very small proportion of the total bond market.
The central banks' holdings of corporate green bonds (BGCB) are
given by:
= −B s BGCB G G 1 (31)
where sG is the share of total outstanding green bonds that central banks
desire to keep on their balance sheet. We assume that this share is
currently equal to zero since central banks do not implement green QE
programmes.
The implementation of a green QE programme should not be
viewed as a simple extension of the current corporate sector pur-
chase programme of central banks. The current corporate QE pro-
grammes have as an aim to improve credit conditions in order to
help central banks achieve their inﬂation targets and they are meant
to be of temporary nature. On the contrary, a green QE would be a
kind of industrial policy with a much longer-term commitment.
Hence, the decision of central banks to conduct such a programme
would require a re-consideration of their mandate or a diﬀerent
interpretation of their role in ensuring ﬁnancial stability in econo-
mies that might face increasing climate-related ﬁnancial risks. This
is especially the case for the central banks of high-income countries,
which have narrower mandates and a more strictly deﬁned role in
comparison with the central banks of low-income countries (see
Campiglio et al., 2018).
3. Calibration, Estimation and Validation of the Model
We have calibrated and estimated the DEFINE 1.0 model employing
global data. Parameter values (a) have been econometrically estimated
using panel data, (b) have been directly calibrated using related data,
previous studies or reasonable values, or (c) have been indirectly cali-
brated such that the model matches the initial values obtained from the
data or generates the baseline scenario. The related details are reported
in Appendix A.19
The model is simulated for the period 2016–2120.20 The aim of the
simulations is to illuminate the long-run trends in the interactions between
the ﬁnancial system and climate change. Hence, no explicit attention is paid
to short-run ﬂuctuations and business cycles. In our simulations we focus on
two speciﬁc sources of uncertainty21: (i) the uncertainty about the values of
key parameters that capture the link between damages and the ﬁnancial
system; (ii) the uncertainty that stems from the stochastic AR(1) processes
included in the investment and credit rationing functions. In order to deal
with the ﬁrst source of uncertainty, we conduct a sensitivity analysis de-
scribed in Section 4. In order to tackle the second source of uncertainty, we
perform 200 Monte Carlo simulations and we report the across-run
averages.
Our baseline scenario represents a ‘business as usual’ pathway whereby
the global economy continues to expand in broad line with recent trends,
and ecological eﬃciency improves moderately due to the continuation of
technological changes and the implementation of some policies that pro-
mote green investment.22 Some key features of our baseline scenario are
shown in Table 5. It is assumed that the economy grows on average at a
rate slightly lower than 2.7% till 2050; in other words, we postulate an
economic expansion a little bit lower than the one observed over the last
two decades or so.23 The unemployment rate remains, on average, close to
6% till 2050. Drawing on the United Nations (2017) population projections
(medium fertility variant), the population is assumed to grow at a declining
rate, becoming equal to around 9.77bn people in 2050. Moreover, the
default rate on corporate loans is assumed to remain, on average, close to
its current level, which is slightly higher than 4%.
CO2 intensity (which captures the industrial emissions per unit of
fossil-fuel energy) declines by 10% till 2050, for example due to the
continuation in the replacement of coal with gas and the use of carbon
capture and storage technologies.24 The share of renewable energy in-
creases to about 25% till 2050 (from about 14% which is the current
level), while energy intensity is assumed to become approximately 30%
lower in 2050 compared to its 2016 level. Material intensity and
Table 5
Key features of the baseline scenario.
Variable Value/trend
Economic growth till 2050 slightly lower than 2.7% (on average)
Unemployment rate till 2050 slightly lower than 6% (on average)
Population in 2050 9.77bn
Labour force-to-population ratio in 2050 0.45
Default rate till 2050 slightly higher than 4% (on average)
CO2 intensity in 2050 as a ratio of CO2 intensity in 2016 around 0.9
Share of renewable energy in total energy in 2050 around 25%
Material intensity in 2050 as a ratio of material intensity in 2016 around 0.9
Energy intensity in 2050 as a ratio of energy intensity in 2016 around 0.7
Recycling rate in 2050 as a ratio of recycling rate in 2016 around 1.4
Annual green investment in the period 2016–2040 around US$1.1tn
Energy use in 2040 as a ratio of energy use in 2016 around 1.4
Yield of conventional bonds quite stable till around 2050
Yield of green bonds declines slightly in the next decade or so
19 The majority of our calibrations rely on data that refer to the global economy and
the global ecosystem. For the econometric estimations (that have been made for our in-
vestment, consumption and labour productivity functions), we have used panel data for a
large set of countries which, however, does not cover the whole global economy. In the
econometric estimations the parameters have the expected sign and are statistically sig-
niﬁcant.
20 The R code used for the simulations is available upon request.
21 A thorough investigation of all key sources of uncertainty is beyond the purpose of
this paper.
22 Carbon pricing is implicitly considered to be one of these policies.
23 Based on data from World Bank.
24 For the importance of these factors in the determination of CO2 intensity, see e.g.
Peters et al. (2017).
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recycling rate also improve. The overall improvement in ecological
eﬃciency indicators is associated with the accumulation of green ca-
pital. In our baseline scenario the annual green investment during the
period 2016–2040 is equal to around US$1.1tn.25 The annual use of
energy is 40% higher in 2040 compared to 2016.26
We also assume that the yield on the conventional bond market
remains relatively stable till 2050, while the yield of green bonds im-
proves in the next decade or so. The latter is a result of an increasing
demand for green bonds that outstrips their supply, in line with recent
trends (see, for example, Climate Bonds Initiative, 2017).
(a) Auto-correlation: output
(c) Auto-correlation: consumption
(e) Cross-correlation: output
(g) Cross-correlation: consumption
(b) Auto-correlation: investment
(d) Auto-correlation: employment
(f) Cross-correlation: investment
(h) Cross-correlation: employment
Fig. 1. Auto-correlations and cross-correlations of observed and simulated data.
Note: The series are expressed in logs and the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter has been used to isolate the cyclical component. For the simulated data, the across-run average
autocorrelations and cross-correlations have been reported. The data for the observed variables have been taken fromWorld Bank and refer to the global economy. Real output
is available for the period 1960–2016, real consumption and real investment are available for the period 1970–2016 and employment is available for the period 1991–2016.
25 Note that IEA (2016, p. 82) estimates that the annual investment in renewables and
energy eﬃciency that is necessary over the period 2016–2040 in order to avoid a global
warming higher that 2 °C is close to US$2tn. Recall that green investment in our model
does not only include investment in renewables and energy eﬃciency: it also includes
investment that improves material intensity and the recycling rate.
26 In the Current Policies Scenario presented in IEA (2016) the energy use in 2040 is
43% higher compared to 2016.
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Fig. 2. Key channels through which climate change and ﬁnancial stability interact in the model.
Fig. 3. Evolution of environmental, macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables, baseline scenario and sensitivity analysis.
Note: The baseline scenario reports across-run averages from 200 Monte Carlo simulations. The values used in this scenario are reported in Appendix A. The
sensitivity range relies on the 8 cases shown in Table 6. For each case, we run 200 Monte Carlo simulations and we keep the across-run averages. The sensitivity range
is derived based on the annual minimum and maximum values of the averages among the 8 cases.
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We do not expect that the structure of the time series data in the
next decades will necessarily be the same with the structure of past time
series. However, it is a useful exercise to compare the auto- and cross-
correlation structure of our simulated data with the observed one in
order to check whether the model produces data with reasonable time-
series properties.27 This is done in Fig. 1. Fig. 1a–d show the auto-
correlation structure of the cyclical component of the simulated and
observed time series for output, consumption, investment and em-
ployment up to 20 lags. Fig. 1e–h show the correlation between the
cyclical component of output at time t and of output, investment,
consumption and employment at time t-lag. The series are expressed in
logs and the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter has been used to isolate the cyclical
component. The simulated data refer to the baseline scenario and
capture only the period 2016–2080 in order to avoid the signiﬁcant
disturbances to the data structures that are caused by climate change
after 2080 or so, when climate-induced bailouts start taking place.
The auto-correlation structure of our simulated data is similar to the
auto-correlation structure of the observed data. Moreover, simulated
investment, consumption and employment appear to be pro-cyclical, in
tune with the empirical data, and their overall cross-correlation with
output resembles the cross-correlation observed in the real data. These
results suggest that our model generates data with empirically reason-
able properties.
4. Climate Change and Financial Stability
Let us ﬁrst summarise the key eﬀects of climate change on economic
variables in our model. Climate damages reduce (i) consumption and
investment demand, (ii) households' demand for conventional corpo-
rate bonds (increasing at the same time the demand for deposits and
government securities), (iii) the labour-determined potential output
(which is aﬀected by labour productivity and labour force) and (iv) the
capital-determined potential output (which is aﬀected by capital stock
and capital productivity). (i) and (ii) are aﬀected by gross damages; in
our baseline scenario we assume that the gross damages are 50% when
T=6°C. On the other hand, (iii) and (iv) are aﬀected by net damages,
which in our baseline scenario are a relatively small proportion of gross
damages. Climate damages also have a direct impact on the proﬁtability
of ﬁrms (since proﬁts are aﬀected by economic growth and the climate-
induced depreciation of capital) and the rate of capacity utilisation
(since the growth rate of output is not necessarily the same with the
growth rate of capital-determined output). Both variables aﬀect the
desired investment of ﬁrms. Moreover, climate change inﬂuences the
rate of employment since the growth rate of output is not necessarily
the same with the labour-determined potential output.28
All these economic eﬀects aﬀect the stability of the ﬁnancial system
Fig. 3. (continued)
27 For similar validation exercises see Assenza et al. (2015) and Caiani et al. (2016).
28 Note that capacity utilisation is given by Y/YK∗, where YK∗ is the capital-determined
potential output (equal to capital productivity times capital stock) and employment rate is
given by Y/YN∗ where YN∗ is the labour-determined potential output (equal to labour
productivity times labour force).
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with feedback eﬀects on the environment. Fig. 2 summarises the main
channels through which climate change and ﬁnancial stability interact.
Fig. 3 plots the simulation results. In the baseline scenario CO2 emis-
sions increase signiﬁcantly over the next decades (Fig. 3c). This rise is
mainly driven by the exponential increase in output due to positive
economic growth (Fig. 3a), the slow improvement in energy eﬃciency
and the low share of renewable energy in total energy (Fig. 3b). Hence,
CO2 concentration in the atmosphere increases, leading to severe global
warming: as Fig. 3d indicates, in 2100 temperature becomes about 4 °C
higher than pre-industrial levels.29
The rise in atmospheric temperature leads to climate change da-
mages. Accordingly, the growth rate of output starts declining (Fig. 3a).
This slowdown of economic activity becomes more intense after 2060
when temperature passes 2.5 °C.30 Declining economic growth and the
destruction of capital harms the proﬁtability of ﬁrms (Fig. 3e) and
deteriorates their liquidity, which in turn increases their rate of default
(Fig. 3f) and thereby increases the bank leverage ratio (Fig. 3g) and
decreases the capital adequacy ratio.31 The overall result is an increase
in credit rationing, which feeds back into economic growth (Fig. 3a)
and the proﬁtability and liquidity of ﬁrms, giving rise to a vicious ﬁ-
nancial cycle. This also slows down the investment in green capital,
disrupting the transition to a low-carbon and more ecologically eﬃcient
economy. Crucially, at some point in time the capital of banks becomes
insuﬃcient to cover the regulatory requirements. Thus, the government
sector steps in and bailouts the banks with adverse eﬀects on the public
debt-to-output ratio (Fig. 3h). Note that the exponential increase in the
public debt-to-output ratio is also explained by (i) the reduction in tax
revenues as a result of lower economic activity and (ii) the fact that the
increase in public indebtedness causes a cumulative increase in interest
payments that increases debt even further.
Furthermore, climate damages aﬀect the liquidity preference of
households. The destruction of capital and the decline in the proﬁt-
ability of ﬁrms induces a reallocation of household ﬁnancial wealth
from corporate bonds towards deposits and government securities,
which are deemed much safer. This is shown in Fig. 3i. The result is a
decline in the price of conventional bonds, which leads to a substantial
increase in their yield in the last decades of our simulation period
(Fig. 3j). This is an example of a climate-induced asset price deﬂation.
Note that the exponential increase in the yield of bonds in the baseline
scenario primarily stems from the convexity of damages: as global
warming becomes more severe, the damages rise at an increasing rate.
The yield of green corporate bonds also increases in our baseline
scenario, after the decline in the ﬁrst years (Fig. 3k). However, the main
reason behind this increase is not the decline in the demand for green
bonds by households. This increase is primarily explained by the in-
crease in the supply of green bonds since desired green investment
continuously increases in our simulation period (Fig. 3l).
Bond price deﬂation has negative eﬀects on economic growth be-
cause it reduces both the wealth-related consumption and the ability of
ﬁrms to rely on the bond market in order to fund their desired invest-
ment. It also leads to less green investment, which aﬀects adversely the
improvement in ecological eﬃciency.
How does the baseline scenario change when key parameters are
modiﬁed? Space limitations do not allow us to explore this question in
detail. However, we conduct a sensitivity analysis that concentrates on
the key parameters that are related to the responsiveness of the ﬁ-
nancial system to climate damages. These include (i) the sensitivity of
the default rate to the illiquidity ratio (def2), (ii) the sensitivity of credit
rationing to the debt service ratio of ﬁrms, bank leverage and capital
adequacy ratio (l2, l3, l4, r2, r3, r4) and (iii) the parameters of the
portfolio choice that capture the sensitivity of the liquidity preference
of households to the global warming damages (λ10', λ20', λ40'). In the
Table 6
Values of parameters modiﬁed in the sensitivity analysis.
Parameter Value in the baseline
scenario
Percentage change (%) compared to the baseline scenario
Case
I
Case
II
Case
III
Case
IV
Case
V
Case
VI
Case
VII
Case
VIII
Parameter of the default rate function (related to the sensitivity
of the default rate to the illiquidity ratio of ﬁrms) (def2)
7.81 50% −50% 50% −50% 50% −50% 50% −50%
Parameter of the function of credit rationing on green loans
(related to the sensitivity of credit rationing to the default
rate) (l2)
2.08 50% −50% −50% 50% 50% −50% −50% 50%
Parameter of the function of credit rationing on green loans
(related to the sensitivity of credit rationing to the leverage
ratio of banks) (l3)
0.04 50% −50% −50% 50% 50% −50% −50% 50%
Parameter of the function of credit rationing on green loans
(related to the sensitivity of credit rationing to the capital
adequacy ratio of banks) (l4)
2.08 50% −50% −50% 50% 50% −50% −50% 50%
Parameter of the function of credit rationing on conventional
loans (related to the sensitivity of credit rationing to the
default rate) (r2)
2.08 50% −50% −50% 50% 50% −50% −50% 50%
Parameter of the function of credit rationing on conventional
loans (related to the sensitivity of credit rationing to the
leverage ratio of banks) (r3)
0.04 50% −50% −50% 50% 50% −50% −50% 50%
Parameter of the function of credit rationing on conventional
loans (related to the sensitivity of credit rationing to the
capital adequacy ratio of banks) (r4)
2.08 50% −50% −50% 50% 50% −50% −50% 50%
Parameter of households' portfolio choice (λ10′) 0.10 50% −50% −50% 50% −50% 50% 50% −50%
Parameter of households' portfolio choice (λ20′) −0.20 50% −50% −50% 50% −50% 50% 50% −50%
Parameter of households' portfolio choice (λ40′) 0.10 50% −50% −50% 50% −50% 50% 50% −50%
29 This increase in temperature in our baseline scenario is broadly in line with the
results of key IAMs (see Nordhaus, 2016). Note that the parameter values that we have
used for the carbon cycle and temperature equations rely on the recent updates of the
DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy) model by Nordhaus (2016). These updates
produce more pessimistic results about the path of atmospheric temperature in the next
decades. See also Bovari et al. (2018).
30 Note that in 2100 the level of output in our baseline scenario is about 30% lower
compared to a scenario in which there are no damages and economic growth continues to
be close to its current level.
31 The impact of climate damages on bank leverage is in line with the empirical evi-
dence reported in Klomp (2014), which shows that natural disasters deteriorate the ﬁ-
nancial robustness of banks. Note that in our model the losses of ﬁrms due to the climate-
induced destruction of their capital stock are not covered by the government or insurance
companies.
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sensitivity analysis, these parameters increase or decrease by 50%
compared to their baseline values. As shown in Table 6, we consider 8
cases which capture diﬀerent combinations in the percentage change of
parameters (i), (ii) and (iii). For each case, we run 200 Monte Carlo
simulations and we keep the across-run averages. The sensitivity range
shown in Fig. 3 is derived based on the annual minimum and maximum
values of the averages among the 8 cases.
The sensitivity analysis illustrates that the evolution of the default
rate, the bank leverage ratio and the yield of conventional corporate
bonds is aﬀected by the changes in the parameter values (see Fig. 3f,
Fig. 3g and Fig. 3j). In particular, it turns out that the default rate in-
creases (decreases) more quickly when its sensitivity to the illiquidity
ratio is higher (lower) compared to the baseline. The same holds for the
bank leverage ratio. In addition, the yield of conventional corporate
bonds declines more rapidly when the portfolio choice of households is
more responsive to climate change damages. However, despite the fact
that the parameter values aﬀect the severity and the time horizon of the
climate-induced ﬁnancial instability, the eﬀects of climate change on
ﬁnancial stability are qualitatively similar.32
5. Eﬀects of a Green QE Programme
In this section we analyse how our results change when a green QE
programme is implemented. We suppose that in 2020 central banks
around the globe decide that they will purchase 25% of the total
amount of green bonds and they commit themselves that they will keep
the same share of the green bond market over the next decades. We also
assume that the proportion of conventional corporate bonds held by
central banks remains equal to its current level.33
Experimentation with various parameter values has shown that the
parameter that plays a key role in determining the eﬀectiveness of a
green QE programme is the sensitivity of the share of desired green
investment to the divergence between the green bond yield and the
conventional bond yield (β2) – see Eq. (9). The higher the value of β2
the more ﬁrms' green investment responds to a monetary policy-in-
duced decline in the yield of green bonds. Consequently, in our simu-
lations we consider a green QE baseline scenario whereby β2 is equal to
Fig. 4. Eﬀects of the implementation of a green QE programme.
Note: The baseline scenario reports across-run averages from 200 Monte Carlo simulations. The values used in this scenario are reported in Appendix A. In Green QE
(baseline) the implementation of a green QE programme (captured by an increase in sG from 0 to 0.25) starts in 2020 and the sensitivity of the desired green
investment to the divergence between the green bond yield and the conventional bond yield (β2) is equal to 1, as in the baseline scenario. The sensitivity range for the
green QE scenario is derived based on a range of values for β2 between 0.5 and 4. For each of these values, we run 200 Monte Carlo simulations and we keep the
across-run averages. The sensitivity range is derived based on the annual minimum and maximum values of the averages among the diﬀerent values of β2.
32 Note that if we allow our simulations to continue after 2120 the share of renewable
energy becomes at some point in time very close to 1, which leads to almost zero
(footnote continued)
industrial CO2 emissions. However, because of the inertia of the climate system, atmo-
spheric temperature continues to increase for many decades.
33 We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of a green QE programme do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly if we
assume that central banks stop holding conventional corporate bonds.
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its baseline value but also some green QE scenarios in which β2 is al-
lowed to take a number of values below and above its baseline value.
The eﬀects of the green QE programme are portrayed in Fig. 4.34
The green QE sensitivity range captures how the eﬀects of a green QE
programme are modiﬁed when β2 changes. As Fig. 4k shows, green QE
boosts the price of green corporate bonds, reducing their yield. This has
various positive implications for climate change and ﬁnancial stability.
Regarding climate change, let us ﬁrst focus on the diﬀerence between
the baseline scenario and the green QE baseline scenario. The reduction
in the green bond yield leads to a lower cost of borrowing for ﬁrms and
a lower reliance on bank lending. This increases overall investment,
including green investment. More importantly, since the yield of green
bonds declines relative to the yield of conventional bonds (Fig. 4j and
k), the share of desired green investment in total investment goes up
(Fig. 4l). As ﬁrms invest more in green capital, the use of renewable
energy increases (Fig. 4b) and energy eﬃciency improves. This leads to
lower CO2 emissions and slower global warming than what would
otherwise be the case.
It should, however, be pointed out that in our simulations green QE
cannot by itself prevent a substantial rise in atmospheric temperature:
as the green QE sensitivity range shows, even with more optimistic
values of β2, global warming is not signiﬁcantly lower than 4 °C at the
end of the century. There are two key reasons for that. First, the interest
rate is just one of the factors that aﬀect green investment. Therefore, a
decline in the green bond yield is not suﬃcient to bring about a sub-
stantial rise in green investment. Second, a higher β2 is conducive to
lower damages, allowing economic activity to expand more rapidly
(Fig. 4a). This higher economic activity places upward pressures on CO2
emissions (Fig. 4c).
Regarding ﬁnancial stability, green QE increases ﬁrm proﬁtability
and reduces the liquidity problems of ﬁrms. This makes the default rate
and bank leverage in the green QE baseline scenario lower compared to
the baseline in which there is no green QE (Fig. 4f and g); it also reduces
the public debt-to-output ratio (Fig. 4h). These beneﬁcial eﬀects on
ﬁnancial stability stem from (i) the reduction in economic damages as a
result of slower global warming and (ii) the lower reliance of ﬁrms'
green investment on bank lending. A higher value of β2 reinforces
generally the ﬁnancial stability eﬀects of green QE.
6. Conclusion
The fundamental changes that are expected to take place in the
climate system in the next decades are likely to have severe implica-
tions for the stability of the ﬁnancial system. The purpose of this article
was to analyse these implications by using a stock-ﬂow-fund ecological
macroeconomic model. Emphasis was placed on the eﬀects of climate
change damages on the ﬁnancial position of ﬁrms and asset price de-
ﬂation. The model was estimated and calibrated using global data and
simulations were conducted for the period 2016–2120.
Our simulation analysis for the interactions between climate change
Fig. 4. (continued)
34 Note that diﬀerent values of β2 would produce a diﬀerent baseline scenario. Hence,
the baseline scenario in which β2= 1 is not directly comparable with the scenarios re-
ﬂected in the green QE sensitivity range since in these scenarios β2 is diﬀerent from 1.
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and ﬁnancial stability produced three key results. First, by destroying
the capital of ﬁrms and reducing their proﬁtability and liquidity, cli-
mate change is likely to increase the rate of default of corporate loans
that could harm the stability of the banking system. Second, the da-
mages caused by climate change can lead to a portfolio reallocation that
can cause a gradual decline in the price of corporate bonds. Third,
climate-induced ﬁnancial instability might adversely aﬀect credit ex-
pansion, exacerbating the negative impact of climate change on eco-
nomic activity. The sensitivity analysis illustrated that these results do
not change qualitatively when key parameter values related to the ﬁ-
nancial system are modiﬁed.
The article also investigated how a green corporate QE programme
could reduce the risks imposed on the ﬁnancial system by climate
change. The QE that has been examined in the paper is of a very dif-
ferent nature compared to the current QE programmes: it has a long-run
horizon and it is a kind of industrial policy rather than a cyclical tool.
The simulation results showed that, by increasing the price of green
corporate bonds, the implementation of such a green QE programme
can reduce climate-induced ﬁnancial instability and restrict global
warming. However, as expected, green QE is not by itself capable of
preventing a substantial reduction in atmospheric temperature. Even
with an optimistic assumption about the sensitivity of green investment
to the divergence between the green bond yield and the conventional
bond yield, global warming is still severe. Hence, many other types of
environmental policies need to be implemented in conjunction with a
green QE programme in order to keep atmospheric temperature close to
2 °C and prevent climate-induced ﬁnancial instability. These could in-
clude traditional green ﬁscal policies (such as carbon taxes and green
public investment), other green ﬁnance policies apart from QE (such as
green loans subsidies and green diﬀerentiated capital requirements)
and regulatory interventions that would induce more environmentally
friendly consumption norms and methods of production. The in-
vestigation of the economic, ﬁnancial and environmental implications
of such policies is left for future research.
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